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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ASSISTANT SECRETARY

SECRET

October 26, 1962

TO: The Under Secretary

FROM: FE - W. Averell Harriman *[Signature]*

Since my colleagues on informal committee have been so preoccupied with other urgent business, I am submitting my own thoughts on a negotiated political settlement without an opportunity for clearance with them.

Attachment.

FE:WAHarriman:aa

SECRET

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Objective of negotiations must be to get nuclear missiles out of Cuba and agreement to keep them out.

Proposals for negotiations:

(1) Along lines of Brazilian Resolution for denuclearization of Latin America with or without Africa.

If this alone is insufficient add:

(2) Along lines of Defanging Resolution (drafted by Cleveland) agreement by U.S. and U.S.S.R. not to place nuclear weapons (IRBMs, MRBMs and ICBMs) in territory of nations other than nuclear powers.

(This would mean removal of our missiles from Turkey and Italy but of course leave open U.K. and all shipboard missiles.)

Agreement should only apply to Europe and Middle East and not Far East confronting China, including India.

Agreement should be put forward not as a trade over Cuba, but emphasized as a first and important step towards disarmament.

DISCUSSION

SECRET

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Through his various statements and by his action in turning back certain ships, Khrushchev has signaled he is prepared to negotiate a settlement with full knowledge of President Kennedy's objective of removal of nuclear missiles in Cuba.

In negotiations this condition should be advanced at once so there can be no question in the Soviet mind of U.S. imperative.

Khrushchev has also given a warning signal that although his line of retreat is now open, serious escalation might cut this off. This is the danger area.

The problem is how to gain sufficient time to carry on negotiated settlement without weakening U.S. present position.

We cannot for long permit the missiles to remain activated in Cuba, or further erection to continue. It should be relatively easy to obtain agreement on stopping further shipments and probably further erection. The

greatest

SECRET

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greatest difficulty will be in deactivation with necessary assurances.

If agreement on deactivation of missiles with minimum inspection is not promptly forthcoming, some further expansion of scope of the blockade may be necessary (such as the addition of POL) to keep pressure on Cuba, but avoiding type of escalation which might cut off Khrushchev's line of retreat.

It may become clear that Zorin is not given sufficient authority to negotiate. Then the establishment of direct contact with Khrushchev on behalf of the President should be given consideration.

WAHarri man:hbs  
10/26/62.

SECRET

**EXCISED COPY FOLLOWS**

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by *JH* DATE 3-21-86  
(  ) RELEASE (  ) DECLASSIFY  
(  ) EXCISE (  ) DECLASSIFY in PART  
(  ) DELAY (  ) Non-responsive info.  
FOI, EO or PA exemptions (B)(1)  
TS authority to:  
(  ) CLASSIFY as \_\_\_\_\_, OADR  
(  ) DOWNGRADE TS to (  ) S or (  ) C, OADR

FE:WAHarriman:aa

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